

Index of Articles, Notes and Reviews appearing in *Public Choice* from Volume XI to the present. (Note: An index of articles appearing in previous *Public Choice* volumes is found on page 119 of Volume X. Beginning with next year's Winter issue, a yearly index will be published).

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Prepared by Betty Hoover.

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